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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to present an information
based view of the strategy/structure linkage. The paper
seeks to compliment previous work on the topic by positing
that information and structure are two sides of the same
coin. It further argues that the structural complexity
of the form or shape of the structure must accommodate
the required complexity of strategic information. Strategic information, the very life-blood of firms, is generated by the strategy program of the firm or business
unit. A way to operationalize and measure strategy and
structure in this mode is presented. Finally, this rather
mechanistic analysis is embedded in a political/incremental process model of matching environment and strategy
to structure.

The Strategy-Structure Linkage:
Conceptual, Methodological and Measurement Issues
This note will delve into one way to conceive the strategy-structure
linkage.

In the development of the topic, certain conceptual, methodological

and measurement concerns will be broached.

This note attempts to complement

the rich case oriented work of Chandler (1962) and Bartlett (1979, 1982), the
descriptive work and review of Galbraith and Nathanson (1978), the empirical
work of Armour and Teece (1979), and Child (1972, 1974, 1975, 1978) and the
conceptual work of Williamson (1975, 1981) and Ouchi (1984).
The Strategy-Structure Imperative
The above works, while tremendously powerful in terms of their own objectives and purposes, do not:
1.

Posit an underlying causal mechanism that substantively links strategy and structure. Most of the attempts to offer hypotheses refer
to the structure/performance linkage, and not the strategy/structure
linkage. Chandler (1962) descriptively discusses the linkage
through examples and Armour and Teece (1979) and Child (1974, 1975)
offer correlational analysis. However, none of these authors supply
a theory of why the linkage between strategy and structure should be
an imperative. Also, the absence of a persuasive theory does not
tell us a priori what the correlations between strategy and structure should look like. Chandler (1962), Armour and Teece (1979) and
Williamson (1975) suggest that M-Form firms will out perform others
because of synergy or the fact that the planning and decision making
processes in such firms allow them to notice and invest in higher
returning projects. These findings with respect to structure/
performance only implicitly discuss the strategy/structure linkage.

2.

Give us, given a theoretical ground, a way to operationalize both
strategy and structure together so that definitive tests of t~
theory can be made. Galbraith and Nathanson (1978:138-143) do give
a schematic treatment of a type of linkage however.

This author is not being critical of the works cited above.

The ommissions

suggested here were simply not part of the objectives of the cited papers.
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This note attempts to advance one theory of the strategy-structure linkage
that is complimentary to the works cited above and propose a method to measure
both strategy and structure so that the theory can be confirmed or refuted.
The development of the paper supports the recent position that information,
properly conceived and managed, represents sources of competitive advantage
for firms.
A Theory of the Strategy-Structure Linkage
As

A.

stated above, we need to make:

1.

A theoretical statement of why there is or should be an imperative
linkage between strategy and structure. The term imperative is
taken from the review of Jackson and Morgan (1982) of the organization theory literature. They review the various schools of thought
which propose certain imperative linkages of the constructs of technology, size, and environment with the construct of structure. The
linkage between strategy and structure is the least developed in the
organization theory literature (Child, 1978).

2.

Given a theoretical underpinning, a position needs to be made on how
both the constructs of strategy and structure together can be operationalized so that a "grounded" measure can be constructed. We
normally use the term "grounded" to refer to theories. I would like
to propose that we use the concept and term at the measurement stage
also. This could mitigate the problem of researchers having to use
less than desired measures of the underlying constructs that they
have labored to theorize.

One Theory of the Strategy-Structure Linkage
We can classically present the theory used in this article with the help

of the following scheme:
0
0
0

Premises
Causal Laws
Initial Conditions

Therefore: Conclusions
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B.

1.

Premise:

The structure of the organization must accommodate the
requisite complexity of the information quantity, flow and
sharing suggested by the strategy program and thrust.

2.

causal Law: As is common knowledge, it is very risky to posit causal laws in the social sciences. However, we can proceed
in a hypothetical mode. A fundamental causal law that
threads through the strategy-structure linkage is the
notion that the strategy program and thrust of the firm is
the cause of the quantity and flow and thereby complexity
of key information that is the very life blood of firms.
The structure of the organization is the primary and natural receptacle of the information complexity. This natural "mating" is hypothesizd to be an organizational imperative. The ~ quantity of information and its reciprocal sharing caused ~ ~ complex and turbulent ~
vironments and~ complex strategies, the~ "complex"
the structure should be. This will be recognized as
simply another form of'the law of requisite variety.
However, if we view this assertion in terms the complexity
of the structural components sharing information, then
this author hopes to demonstrate a different view of the
strategy-structure linkage. Again, this view is complementary and not rival to the works cited above.
3.

Initial Conditions: Given a level of environmental and strategic complexity, there will be a feasible range (set) of
information complexity that is appropriate. This appropriate range of information complexity can be approximately measured. A feasible set of appropriate structural
complexity can be measured approximately also. The two
constructs -- structure and information -- are really two
sides of the same coin according to this view.

4.

Conclusion: The requisite complexity and shape of
structure will be partially deter"iii'irled ~ the
and intial conditions. As can be seen, these
tions will vary depending on the situation at
Figure 1 shows these ideas in schematic form.

the macro
causal law
configurahand.

Fleshing Out the Strategy-Structure Linkage
It will be useful to provide more detail of how this view of the

strategy-structure linkage would be conceptualized and operationalized.

A

following section will attempt to embed this rather mechanical analysis into a
model of Environment-Strategy-Structure that is politically and dynamically
oriented.
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In the development of this view, it will be paramount to build indicators
or attributes of the strategic complexity of the structure.

These attributes,

when measured and summed up, can give us an interval level indicator of the
structural complexity.

It is to be noted that this measure is not the same

thing as the shape of the structure.

Conceivably, the same level of struc-

tural complexity could adhere to various different shapes of the structure.
To press the argument further, a functional type of shape could be as "complex" as a matrix shape, depending on the level of the four attributes discussed below.

The cumulative evidence of the literature suggests the follow-

ing could, if properly operationalized, measure the inherent structural complexity present or required:
1.

The Specific Diversity of the Structure
Following Pielou (1966), Bigler (1982), Donaldson and Lorsch (1983)
and Palepu (1985) we can use the construct behind the Shannon-Weaver
formula for specific diversity to suggest the specific diversity of
the structure. This formula:
Specific Diversity

=-

N

SUM Pi (Log Pi) where Pi
1

= proportion

of a "species" present in 1 ••• N categories shows that as there are
more categories represented and as the proportion of a population is
more evenly spread among the categories, the more diverse the population will be. The formula then measures both the number of categories present and the evenness of distribution among the categories. For our purposes the specific diversity of a structure can be
measured by the number of strategic building blocks in the structure
(building blocks being departments, SBUs, groups, sectors, etc.) and
the evenness of the communication and information that is initiated,
received and feedback among the building blocks.
2.

The Shape of the Structure
This attribute can be represented by how flat or tall the structure
is. This is the traditional way of measuring such things as degree
of bureaucracy, degree of centralization or autonomy. However, the
flatness or tallness of the structure, measured by the number of
levels, or its very shape and architecture might be able to tell us
something about the number of elements in the structure that initiate and receive strategic information and the evenness of the
transmission among them.
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3.

Absolute Quantity of Information Sent, Received, Processed and Feedback
This attribute requires little explanation. It is simply an attempt
to measure the total quantity of strategic information that is
"handled" and processed to some degree.

4.

The Time Span of Feedback of Information
Following Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), this attribute is the time it
takes for a bit of information to be sent (initiated) and feedback
to some appropriate "home."

These four attributes could, if properly operationalized, describe the strategic complexity of the structure.

Before I offer some hypotheses concerning

the above attributes, perhaps some definitions would be in order.

With regard

to information, a strategic component or building block (SBU, group, sector,
etc.) can:
1.

Initiate (transmit) Only:
laterally.

2.

Receive Only.

3.

Initiate and Receive (this unit is the proactive initiator).

4.

Receive and Transmit (this unit reacts to an initiator).

It can transmit information up, down or

Given these observations, the following hypotheses can be advanced:

H1:

The more information that is initiated, transmitted, received and
processed the more complex the structure is.

Hz:

The more the absolute quantity of information that is initiated,
transmitted, received and processed the more complex the structure
is. The reason for the distinction between H1 and H2 is that in Hl
a given bit of strategic information can, perhaps because of its
political content, pass through a "cycle" of information several
times before coming to rest. H2 represents more actual distinct
bits of information that are passed through the system.
The shorter the time span of feedback for strategic information, the
more complex or diverse the structure is. In order to correct for
the number of levels in the firm, a ratio of time span of feedback
divided by the number of levels could be used. So, given two firms
with a varying number of levels, the one with the smallest ratio of
time span to number of levels would have a more complex structure
than the one with the larger ratio.
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If the structure can accomodate all of these occurences with little
friction, then the structure is deemed to be "fluid." It is the
fluidity of the structure and not just its shape that determines how
flexible and adaptive the firm can be.
Some interesting observations come to mind when one views the complexity
of the structure in this manner.

For example, it is not just the number of

layers in an organization that determines the complexity of the structure.

A

relatively bureaucratic firm (one that is held to have too many layers) can
actually have a less complex structure than one with say only two layers.

The

complexity of the structure at Apple Computer then could be much more complex
(by our measure of structural complexity) than say Burroughs or Xerox.

There

is simply a blur of information that is processed in a very fluid manner.
This is not to say that a large firm with many layers cannot have the requisite strategic complexity and fluidity of its structure.
perfect case in point.

A firm like IBM is a

An interesting derivative question would be what are

the exogenous and endogenous factors that allow IBM to enjoy all of the fruits
of being a large company.
If the requisite complexity of the structure is crafted properly, the
following positive attributes of the structure should surface.
positive attributes that make for fluid structures.

It is these

The structure should be:

1.

Flexible:

This is where one of the building blocks of the structure
can changed or one can be added, and there will not be an
appreciable decrease in the optimal level of complexity
and fluidity. In other words, the morphos or form of the
organization is malleable.

2.

Adaptive:

This is where a building block, possibly after having
shown a degree of necessary flexibility when a change was
called for either:
a.

Learns:

the unit acts on "new" information and
either stores it and or passes it on to a
higher or lower unit.
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b.

Develops: the unit uses the "new" information to
enhance or change its form.

3.

Practical:

For any required task imposed on the structure by the
environment and strategy, the least diverse or complex
of a feasible set of possibilities should be chosen.
Simply stated, this means that the most cost effective
level of structural complexity should be chosen.

4.

Legitimate:

The structural change or program must respect the very
subtle power bases that have been formed in the organization. Many failed structural programs have been
caused by change programs that have too hastily unearthed power bases that have taken years to form.

The above analysis has attempted to describe one view of the strategy/
structure linkage.

The tone of the exigesis so far has been rather mechanical

and may have suggested a rather deterministic view of the linkage.

The next

section will attempt to imbed this mechanistic analysis into the context of a
model of the strategy/structure linkage that suggests the process is political, incremental and one that is perhaps more art than science.
C.

A Process/Political Model of the Strategy/Structure Linkage
Figure 2 shows one model of the strategy/structural change process.

It

attempts to be purely strategic in its orientation and attempts to underscore
the imperative relationship between strategy and structure.

Components 1

through 6 suggest that the imperative linkage is best viewed as a dynamic systern.

Changing environments will at some point cause certain "key success fac-

tors" to become more or less salient (see Bigler:
plication).

1983,1985 for a fuller ex-

This dynamic process could be gradual or could be catastrophic.

Regardless of the rapdity of the environmental change, this may suggest a
change in the strategy program of the firm.

As Porter (1985) and Bigler

(1985) have argued, this will likely suggest that new functional areas (marketing, production, etc.) and value chain components (see Porter, 1985) will
emerge as crucial players in the firm's quest for comparative advantage.

The
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cumulative effect through the model to this point may necessitate a change .in
the feasible set of criteria for the strategic building blocks of the structure.

General Electric's criteria for a structural component (department,

group, sector) to be a strategic business unit (SBU) are fairly well documented there.

These criteria:

1.

Component must have a unique business mission independent of the
mission of any other component.

2.

The component must have a clearly defined set of competitors.

3.

The component must be a full-fledged competitor in external markets
(as opposed to a dominant role as an internal supplier).

4.

The component must have the ability to accomplish integrated strategic planning with respect to products, markets, facilities and
organization relatively independently of other SBUs.

5.

The component manager must be able to "call the shots" in areas
crucial to the success of the business-- e.g., technology,
manufacturing, marketing and cash management.

may need to be changed, however, as influenced by the first four components in
Figure 2. General Foods SBU criteria:
1.

Inventory the products offered by the corporation to identify specific products, product lines, and mixes of product lines. Determine the end user needs that each product is intended to satisfy.

2.

Identify which products satisfy similar needs (e.g., foods for main
meals). Also determine which products satisfy the needs of more
than one user group.

3.

Form units composed of one or more products or product lines that
satisfy similar needs (e.g., food preparation.appliances). The
products that form a planning unit should have major strategic
features in common, such as distribution channels, market target,
technology, and/or advertising and sales force strategies.

4.

Determine if there are management, market, operating, or other
advantages to combining two or more planning units into a division,
group, or business segment.

5.

Review the proposed scheme to determine if it offers both operational and strategic advantages. Do the potential benefits of the
scheme exceed the costs?

while useful and practical for their current situation, could also be forced
to be changed by changes in the first four panels of Figure 2.
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These occurrences in turn allows certain of the strategic "building blocks" of
the organization to become more visible.

This new found visibility, which may

re-establish old building blocks or adhere to previously less visible building
blocks, will help to either solidify old power bases, or cause the formation
of new power bases.

Hickson, et.al., (1971) and March (1962), have reported

on the essential information basis for power coalitions in firms.

As the next

panel in the model shows, the cumulative effect of one cycle of this process/
political model will suggest a likely major configuration of the building
blocks in the "macro" structure of the firm.

This configuration will be

either a funtional, divisional, matrix or some hybrid of these.

As

has been

hypothesized in the previous sections of the paper, the last portion of the
model suggests that this major structural configuration needs to maximize:
0

Flexibility

0

Adaptiveness

0

Legitimacy

Subject to:
0

The minimum level of structural complexity:
0

Specific Diversity of the Structure

0

The Shape of the Structure

0

The Absolute Quantity of Information Sent, Received, Processed
and Feedback

0

The Time Span of Feedback of Information

As was stated above, this minimum level gives practical structures.

If all of

the preceding is architected usefully, then fluidity of structure should result.
Although Bartlett (1979, 1982) has described structural change in organizations as evolutionary as opposed to revolutionary, one can observe in Figure
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2 that this is an inherently dynamic process.

Potential forces for change ex-

ist almost anyhwere in the model.
Conclusion
This paper has tried to present a complementary view of the strategy/
structure linkage and process.

It has attempted to advance an underlying

causal mechanism that bridges the linkage, that of the imperative requirement
that the structure accomodate the requisite information "thrown off" from the
strategy program.

It has attempted to operationalize some attributes of the

requisite structural complexity.

The paper has tried to embed the causal

mechanism and attributes in a political/ process model of strategy/structure
transformation.
outcomes:

Finally, the paper has suggested some desirable strategic

flexibility, adaptivness, practicality and legitimacy.

This one

complementary view hopefully has filled a gap in the literature by suggesting
an operationally oriented view of the strategy/structure linkage and process
that should aid managers diagnose and prescribe.
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